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A B S T R A C T
Despite several decades of dedicated R&D, fusion, a potentially world-changing energy source, remains decades
away from commercialisation. The majority of development thus far has been via publicly-funded programmes
led by government laboratories focused on scientific research and in which commercialisation strategy and
innovation play a minor role. Generally, such programmes follow a linear model of innovation in which com-
mercial aspects are not considered until later in development. In consequence and without intention, devices not
well-suited for commercial application are being pursued. In recent years, however, privately funded fusion
start-ups have emerged with the goal of accelerating the commercialisation of fusion. Fusion start-ups are, by
necessity, operating on a fundamentally different model of innovation: agile innovation, whereby technology is
developed flexibly and iteratively towards an explicit commercial goal. Technology Roadmapping is a method
that has been effective for supporting agile innovation but thus far has had limited application to mission-led
hardware development. We characterise the key features of the fusion innovation approach and create a novel
Technology Roadmapping process for fusion start-ups, which is developed via a case study with Tokamak Energy
Ltd. The main elements of the developed process, the resulting Technology Roadmap, and its impact are pre-
sented.
1. Introduction
Harnessing the energy from nuclear fusion has long been heralded
as the solution to the world's energy problems. Nuclear fusion is the
process that powers the sun and the stars, in which atomic nuclei, under
high pressure and high temperatures, can overcome the forces of nu-
clear repulsion and join to create a heavier nucleus, releasing high le-
vels of energy in the process (Burbidge et al., 1957, Chen, 2011). On
Earth, scientists are developing fusion reactors to mimic the process to
produce energy from the fusion reaction for the generation of clean
electricity or process heat. However, despite dedicated government-led
publicly funded fusion research programmes since the 1960s, latest
projections place commercialisation of fusion energy well into the
second half of the 21st century. These timescales would mean that fu-
sion will likely be too late to contribute to the current and near-future
efforts to avoid serious climate change. Thus fusion is likely to be ex-
cluded from the current clean energy technology revolution to move
away from a dependence on fossil fuels (Lopes-Cardozo, 2019). This
paper considers an alternative pathway to fusion commercialisation, as
motivated by a desire to deliver beneficial impacts to society on a
shorter timescale.
The long-standing conventional view has been that the development
of fusion is possible only through government-funded and government-
coordinated science projects. In those programmes, the approach has
been first to achieve a high degree of scientific understanding and to
resolve key technical challenges. The broader challenge of commer-
cialisation is not considered until much later in development. This ap-
proach has resulted in increasingly large, complex and expensive de-
vices that typically take decades to construct and operate. Such devices
are then intended to operate as scientific research facilities for several
more decades. Fusion research and development for energy supply has
thus far been based almost solely on a single technical approach: the
tokamak (Ikeda, 2009, Sánchez, 2014). Tokamaks use magnetic fields
to confine a plasma containing ionised isotopes of hydrogen, typically
deuterium and tritium1, and auxiliary systems to heat the plasma to
high temperature (~ 100 M Kelvin). At high temperatures, the
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deuterium and tritium ions fuse to make heavier elements, mainly he-
lium, and in the process release energetic neutrons. Under the right
conditions, net power from the DT fusion reaction can be achieved.
However, such conditions have not yet been demonstrated, and thus
achieving net power conditions are the central focus of all fusion pro-
grammes.
Tokamaks are complex devices with many systems and components,
all of which are necessary to develop and harness energy from the
nuclear fusion reaction. The focus on the tokamak design in the latter
part of the 20th century culminated in the creation of the internationally
coordinated ITER project, which will be the largest tokamak ever built
with a plasma volume of about 1000 m3, an estimated cost of about
$20B by 2025, and a design-to-operation time in the order of 30 years
(Clery, 2015, Locatelli, 2017). The plasma generated by ITER is ex-
pected to produce approximately ten times more power than is used to
create and heat it. ITER is regarded as being a major step towards the
realisation of fusion energy. Fig. 1 shows a labelled schematic of the
ITER tokamak.
Delays to the ITER project, as well as the advent of new technologies
and recently improved understanding of the physics of fusion plasmas
suggest that alternative approaches based on smaller, simpler and
cheaper devices might be possible (Costley et al., 2015, Whyte et al.,
2016)2. This notion has stimulated the emergence of more than a dozen
entrepreneur-led and privately funded enterprises, here referred to as as
fusion start-ups, all of which are aiming to develop fusion on a faster
timescale. Principally, such fusion start-ups are pursuing smaller and
simpler devices, and some have adopted an approach based on the to-
kamak and thus have a well-developed physics base (see
(Gryaznevich et al., 2015, Sorbom et al., 2015)). Two examples of to-
kamak based approaches are Tokamak Energy in the UK
(Tokamak Energy Tokamak Energy Ltd Website) and Commonwealth
Fusion Systems in the U.S. (Commonwealth Fusion Systems Website
2019). Examples of start-ups pursuing alternative novel concepts are
First Light Fusion in the UK (First Light Fusion First Light Fusion
Website) and General Fusion in Canada (General Fusion
Website: generalfusion.com 2019). All employ novel and disruptive
technologies on critical, high leverage components, for example, high
temperature superconducting (HTS) magnets for tokamaks, and low-
cost plasma drivers and lasers for non-tokamak concepts (see
(Wurden et al., 2016)).
Despite distinct differences in technical approach, all fusion start-
ups share a common aim: to accelerate the development of fusion via
less complex, smaller, cheaper devices, with the explicit goal of com-
mercialisation. All fusion start-ups are backed by investors who want to
see rapid development towards a commercial product as well as a re-
turn on investment. As such, the fundamental difference between public
programmes and fusion start-ups is not just in the technical approach to
fusion – that is, the reactor concept – but in the development approach
or, more specifically, the approach to innovation3. Thus far, public
fusion programmes have mainly followed a linear model of innovation
in which science and technology aspects are the focus, while aspects
relating to commercialisation play only a minor role, particularly in the
early development phases. In contrast, fusion start-ups are following a
fundamentally different model of innovation: primarily agile innova-
tion, with some elements of lean innovation. Agile innovation focuses,
in particular, on building, testing and learning iteratively on rapid cy-
cles, which facilitates accelerated development towards an explicit
commercial goal (Ries, 2011). It is an approach used in the space ex-
ploration sector, for example, by SpaceX (Rigby et al., 2018). Lean in-
novation evolved from manufacturing with a focus on minimising waste
in terms of time, resource and effort.
Fusion innovation has not yet been significantly explored or char-
acterised in the existing literature. Accordingly, by first exploring the
core principles that underpin the innovation approach of publicly-
funded government-led fusion programmes, this paper characterises the
current paradigm shift towards fusion start-ups, and draws parallels
with the space exploration sector. However, innovation is a dynamic
process that does not occur naturally. It involves the continuous review
and iteration of the medium and long-term strategies to ensure that
technology development in the near-term is in the direction of com-
mercial interest (Fitzgerald et al., 2011, Pisano, 2015). Fusion start-ups
require tools and methods to navigate the commercialisation process.
One tool commonly applied to support innovation management, and
agile innovation, in particular, is Technology Roadmapping. Tech-
nology Roadmapping is a process that provides an overview of key
activities required to develop specific technologies or products for an
organisation or company. It facilitates the creation of an innovation
strategy through the alignment of technology or product development
with an organisation's capabilities, its commercial goals and market
needs (Phaal et al., 2010, International Energy Agency 2014,
Albright and Kappel, 2003, Kostoff and Schaller, 2001). Technology
Roadmapping has been adapted to a wide range of contexts, including
to support agile innovation. However, thus far, it has had limited ap-
plication to problems involving hardware development that typically
require long timescales and significant up-front investment.
We have developed a novel Technology Roadmapping process
Figure 1. Schematic of the ITER tokamak with labels indicating core systems. Adapted from (ITER Organisation 2019) with permission of the ITER organisation
(©iter.org).
2 The compact, high-field tokamak approach was originally conceived by
Bruno Coppi and others in the early 1980s and proposed as an alternative to
ITER. A compact high field device utilising copper toroidal field coils
(IGNITOR) is still under active development (Coppi et al., 2015). If Ignitor had
been developed to prove ignition in a tokamak it would have added great im-
petus to fusion development, and perhaps accelerated the emergence of fusion
start-ups that is seen today.
3 Herein we take the definition of innovation to be “invention plus exploita-
tion”.
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tailored for such applications. We have used it in a case study with
Tokamak Energy Ltd, a privately funded fusion start-up based in the UK
aiming to realise commercial fusion via the spherical tokamak and HTS
magnets (Sykes et al., 2018, Costley, 2019, Windridge, 2019). The
Technology Roadmapping process, as well as the resulting roadmap and
the impact on how it supports development and innovation, are derived
from the application at Tokamak Energy. The description of the process
and its outputs provides a framework for other fusion start-ups or si-
milarly complex or challenging hardware-focused technology en-
deavours. Our work represents a new application of roadmapping to
agile organisations pursuing mission-led hardware development, espe-
cially start-ups. In this paper, we present the process, the results and
applications of our work, and recommendations for future development
in this area.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2, the approach to
innovation for the public fusion programme and hence the fundamental
differences of the fusion start-up approach are outlined. A brief over-
view of Technology Roadmapping, with a focus on its potential use-
fulness to the fusion start-up context, is provided in section 3. The steps
to develop a first-pass roadmap are described in section 4. The process
to develop the roadmap further is described in section 5, with specific
emphasis on the application at Tokamak Energy as the case study.
Section 6 details the outcomes and impact of the roadmapping at To-
kamak Energy. In section 7, strengthening the roadmap by adding a
commercial layer to the roadmap using established analysis tools is
discussed. The generalisability of the process and possible application
beyond the single case study, including to other fields, is discussed in
section 8. The paper is summarised in Section 9.
2. Fusion start-ups: A paradigm shift
2.1. Public fusion programmes and the linear model of innovation
The early years of fusion development were underpinned by a desire
to shift an early Cold War nuclear arms race into something that instead
resembled social value. Famously, the development of ZETA (Zero
Energy Thermonuclear Assembly), an early non-tokamak fusion re-
actor, at Harwell, UK was based on previous experiments from the
nuclear weapons laboratory at Aldermaston (Braams and Stott, 2002,
Carruthers, 1988). ZETA, despite some important scientific successes, is
remembered for erroneous mass media reports that evidence of fusion
had been seen. It later became clear, in line with US and Soviet ex-
periments, that fusion had not occurred. ZETA caused embarrassment
for the British fusion community, but nevertheless the rapid shift in
focus towards civil fusion programmes continued in many countries
including the UK. These grew in strength and gradually assumed re-
markable prominence in international relations
(ITER Organisation, 2018). Several decades later in 1985, and after
considerable success with tokamaks, a crucial step in the development
of fusion was reached. An agreement was made between the leader of
the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and President of the United States
of America, Ronald Reagan, for the joint development of a large scale
fusion device; the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(now known only as ITER) (ITER Organisation The ITER Story). The
cost and scale of the ITER project, alongside its political importance,
brought about a shift in the organisational culture for fusion scientists
and engineers. For such projects, technical proposals are simulated and
tested before being implemented into the design and to proceed with
greater technical certainty requires time and delays can accumulate. It
is perhaps therefore unsurprising that government-led publicly funded
fusion efforts spend enormous amounts of time and money rigorously
planning every step of the way forward to ensure the best chance of
success. It seems that such publicly funded fusion programmes may be
incapable of agile innovation; rather, they generally follow the more
cautious linear model of innovation.
The linear model of innovation, also referred to as the pipeline
model, places science and technology as the main drivers of innovation,
and represents an approach to innovation that is “technology-push”,
where the technology is developed from scientific research and then
subsequently “pushed” into the market (Bush, 1945, Bonvillian and
Weiss, 2015, Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). It typically underpins gov-
ernment-led projects, by guiding the early stages of innovation that
carry a high cost and technological risk before industry takes over to
take the technology to market (Fitzgerald et al., 2011, Bush, 1945,
Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015).
A variation of the pipeline model is the extended pipeline model. The
stage of innovation between R&D and commercial market is commonly
known as the “valley of death”. The extended pipeline model is typically
associated with the development of radical technology as it sees gov-
ernment involvement continue to the latter stages of the innovation
process. In effect, therefore, it supports the maturity of the technology
through the valley of death, reducing the risk of technological failure
between a prototype and a first commercial product (Lopes-
Cardozo, 2019, Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015, Rogers, 2003,
Branscomb and Auerswald, 2002).
Both variants of the linear model, principally by way of govern-
ment-led defence R&D, were behind some of the great successes of the
20th century, for example in computing, space, biotechnology, and, of
particular relevance here, nuclear fission technology (Bonvillian and
Weiss, 2015, Ruttan, 2006). At the dawn of the atomic age, the only
model of innovation for technology development was the linear model,
and because of the scale, cost, and radioactive nature of the experi-
mental fission devices, government laboratories undertook the devel-
opment via this model. Harnessing energy from the fission reaction is
relatively straightforward compared to fusion. Once it was demon-
strated that power production was feasible, private companies quickly
emerged to take on the development and the commercialisation of
fission-based nuclear power technology. Accordingly, government la-
boratories subsequently moved to support the nuclear industry by
supporting R&D. That has not been the case for fusion. Fusion re-
presents a more significant technical challenge which must first be
overcome in order to show its commercial potential. It is taking much
longer to develop the technology past the early stage, and fusion has
remained predominantly in the domain of government laboratories,
and somewhat held back by linear innovation. Accordingly, over half a
century after the commercialisation of fission, the development of fu-
sion continued on the linear model, which is evident through dedicated
efforts by multiple nations to design and commission large-scale next-
step DEMO devices after ITER. These are not expected to operate until
at least 2050. In the context of the linear innovation model, DEMO
reactors are prototypes intended to be the final step before a first
commercial fusion device, but – importantly – is not a commercial
device. Instead, the expectation is that industry will take over after
DEMO, following the convention of the linear model. However, the
recent emergence of significant privately funded fusion start-ups is
disrupting this paradigm.
As a government-led project that has consumed a substantial por-
tion of global fusion R&D resource over the past two decades, ITER has
limited the development of alternative approaches and effectively
“placed all of fusion's eggs in one basket” (Walker and Haines, 1997). The
success of projects such as ITER is paramount. Incentives and pressures
lead to an avoidance of risk via, for example, only permitting the use of
mature technologies. Risk minimization and avoidance leads to more
rigorous designing and testing, which in turn creates delays and cost
overruns. In extremis, this cycle becomes the normal to drive an ap-
proach that is dominated by the notion that “failure is not an option”
R.J. Pearson, et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 158 (2020) 120064
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(McCurdy, 2001). For ITER, the focus on rigorous planning and testing
to reduce risk before building has resulted in increased cost and delays
(Lopes-Cardozo, 2019). Beyond ITER, for publicly funded government-
led fusion programmes in general, this has led to the pursuance of de-
vices that are not well suited for commercial application and unlikely to
be developed fast enough to contribute to the energy mix until at least
the latter part of the 21st century (Lopes-Cardozo, 2019). Similar pro-
blems have previously manifested in other large-scale publicly-funded
and government-led projects such as several of NASA's space pro-
grammes (see (McCurdy, 2001, Board of Space Studies: National
Academy of Sciences Engineering and Medicine 2017)).
Weaknesses of the linear model of innovation include a lack of
feedback and learning, which will be detailed subsequently in sec-
tion 2.2. However, one particular weakness is the minimal emphasis on
commercial requirements as a driver for development in the near and
mid-term stages (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015). Thus, development on
the linear model commonly yields products that may be technologically
advanced, but which may not be commercially viable. A typical ex-
ample of this is the development of Concorde, which, while arguably an
engineering masterpiece, was a significant commercial failure
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986)4. Fusion energy has consistently been
conveyed as a technology with the potential to be superior to any
competing energy technology. Beyond the fact that this promise is yet
to be demonstrated in reality, technological sophistication is not in-
trinsically valued in the market unless it offers superior performance
with only a modest increase in cost (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986,
Walker and Haines, 1997). In short, the slow progress and high de-
velopment cost of large government-led fusion projects are con-
sequences of the perceived need to reduce risk as well as adherence to a
linear model of innovation.
As early as 1981, it was suggested that fusion based on large toka-
maks would not result in commercial success due to scale and com-
plexity, and thus cost (Carruthers, 1981). This perspective was echoed
and further developed over the subsequent decades by Kulcinski and
Santarius (Kulcinski and Santarius, 1998), the Electric Power Research
Institute (Kaslow et al., 1994), and Walker and Haines (Walker and
Haines, 1997). These authors advocated that commercialisation could
be emphasised through the pursuit of simpler (but not necessarily
smaller) and low-cost experimental reactors. This approach would also
motivate developers to explore routes to commercialisation that were
not solely focused on electricity generation. Despite the rationale for
such an approach, which did not dispute the scientific basis of large
tokamaks but rather the approach to development (and intrinsically the
innovation approach), the direction of ITER has remained unchanged,
and has been firmly at the centre of focus of the international fusion
programme for the past two decades. However, the emergence of pri-
vately funded fusion start-ups is beginning to disrupt this status quo and
create a paradigm shift.
2.2. Innovation in fusion start-ups and parallels with the space exploration
sector
In contrast to public fusion programmes, private fusion start-ups are
backed by investors who naturally want to see rapid development to-
wards a commercial product as well as a return on investment. Limited
resources, and in some cases an incomplete understanding of the core
science and only partially developed technology, requires start-ups and
their backers to be prepared to accept higher risk. Private sector start-
ups have an attitude to risk not based on strategies of minimization and
avoidance, but rather the focus is on a need to maintain forward mo-
mentum, to expect problems and to learn from them. This strategy
works well when faced with the difficulties that are inevitable in highly
complex and tightly coupled systems with a focus on hardware devel-
opment. With this higher acceptance of risk, and with smaller and
simpler machines, fusion start-ups can develop technology at higher
speed and lower cost, and thus can improve the chance of successful
innovation (McCurdy, 2001). By rapidly learning and adapting from
failures, fusion start-ups expect to make significant progress measured
in the order of years rather than decades. Accordingly, the underlying
philosophy of fusion start-ups to iterate rapidly, and to proceed with
risk and to learn from failure, indicates that they operate on a funda-
mentally different model of innovation. Ostensibly, a “paradigm shift”
towards fusion start-ups developing via this new model is underway5.
It is instructive to draw a comparison between the fledgeling fusion
paradigm shift and the more established shift of start-ups seeking to
commercialise space exploration and travel. The parallels in the in-
novation approach are clear; fusion start-ups are to publicly-funded
government-led fusion programmes as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin
Galactic are to governmental or intergovernmental space agencies such
as NASA or the ESA. Both fusion start-ups and space sector start-ups are
funded by private capital and are disrupting a sector previously occu-
pied only by national programmes. Where NASA's mission is to advance
the boundaries of technology and science, space start-ups (SpaceX is
perhaps the bestknown example) have been founded to commercialise
space travel. Similarly, where ITER is an experimental project that will
help pave the way for future commercial development (via a next-step
DEMO reactor), fusion start-ups are focused on exploiting the tech-
nology's commercial potential. Both sectors require significant upfront
investments for the development of expensive and complex hardware,
for which the development unavoidably has high front-end risk.
However, both also come with the promise of realising a world-chan-
ging innovation. SpaceX has actively demonstrated that by learning
rapidly from failure, through short innovation cycles, they minimise the
time required to build, test and learn, hence accelerating overall de-
velopment. SpaceX is farther progressed in its mission to commercialise
space travel than other similar technology start-ups are in their re-
spective missions and is thus inspiring others to adopt its approach.
Consequentially, the SpaceX model is now being suggested as a foun-
dation for the development of advanced nuclear fission power, for ex-
ample, see (Bowen, 2019, Abdalla, 2019)6.
Throughout the history of technological development, it has always
been the first demonstration – for example, the first controlled powered
flight or the first controlled fission reaction – that was, often in hind-
sihght, considered as the “breakthrough” point. In contrast, controlled
fusion has been achieved in the JET and TFTR tokamaks but not yet at a
level where net fusion power has been achieved (see (Keilhacker et al.,
1999, Hawryluk et al., 1998)). Thus, the critical breakthrough scientific
step towards the realisation of fusion has yet to be achieved, namely:
controlled net fusion power7. A key distinction is that while SpaceX is
confident that space travel has been demonstrated to be technically
possible, there is uncertainty around the technical feasibility of
achieving controlled fusion for fusion start-ups. It is, therefore, in-
structive to draw a comparison with the Wright brothers as a similar
mission-led endeavour which was pursued with great technical
4 We use ‘arguable’ to describe the engineering excellence of Concorde as
serious safety weaknesses of the aircraft were revealed by the tragic crash of an
Air France Concorde near Paris on the 25th of July 2000, which highlights that
engineering and commercial success are not always easily decoupled in the
development of hardware.
5 We take the definition of paradigm shift from (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015)
and (Kuhn, 1962).
6 In particular, Abdalla et al. have developed this theme further by providing
a view of how the SpaceX innovation approach could be adopted by organi-
sations in the nuclear fission industry (Abdalla, 2019).
7 While fusion-based thermonuclear weaponry was developed and demon-
strated in the 1950s, and this was indeed important for the demonstration of
fusion physics, we do not regard that step as being as the fusion energy
breakthrough outlined above. This is because the ‘hydrogen bomb’ explosions
were uncontrolled once initiated.
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uncertainty8. Fusion start-ups are aiming to commercialise fusion on an
accelerated timescale, but before they can start on that development,
they have to demonstrate fusion's breakthrough moment. Rather than
comparing the current position of fusion start-ups to SpaceX, it is more
appropriate to compare it to the position of NASA in the 1960s before it
was successful in landing humans on the moon or to the Wright
brothers in the early 1900s before anybody had demonstrated con-
trolled flight. Such missions required technological innovation in an
unproven venture. However, the approaches of NASA and ITER have
been similar because both faced major technical challenges in which
there were many unknowns and risks, yet neither was primarily moti-
vated by commercialisation. Therefore, combining aspects of the com-
mercially-driven SpaceX approach to innovation with the science-
driven approach of historical innovation, i.e. with and without explicit
commercial motivation respectively, we begin to converge on the
principles that characterise the innovation approach, and the innova-
tion model, adopted by fusion start-ups.
2.3. Combining agile with lean: a model of innovation for fusion start-ups
An innovation model for fusion start-ups must encompass both the
technical and commercial aspects of development, i.e. both the “tech-
nology-push” and “market-pull” drivers, and this is the central differ-
ence to public fusion programmes. The innovation organisation model is
one such model that accounts for both (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015).
The innovation organisation model includes the linear (pipeline) and
extended pipeline model, as previously introduced, as well as the in-
duced innovation model and the chainlink model (Bonvillian and
Weiss, 2015, Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, Ruttan, 2000)9. For fusion
start-ups, however, an innovation model must also be suitable for
iterative hardware-based technology development, and must emphasise
an underpinning philosophy to fail and learn quickly through building
and testing. Such an approach aligns with the well-understood princi-
ples of agile development and lean production. However, neither agile
nor lean is a direct fit. Before characterising how fusion start-ups en-
compass aspects of both agile and lean, we briefly outline the key as-
pects of these two methods of innovation.
Agile was originally developed to facilitate rapid innovation in
software (see (Beck et al., 2001)), but since its inception, it has been
adapted to a variety of other sectors, hence agile innovation (Rigby et al.,
2018, Beck et al., 2001, Abrahamsson et al., 2002, Hannola et al., 2013,
Tura et al., 2017). The fundamental principle of agile innovation is to
develop a technology or product by iterating fast, failing fast and -
consequently - learning fast, which allows for adaptation to emergent
risks and opportunities due to the short time over which the iteration
occurs (Ries, 2011, Miller and Lee, 2001). Agile innovation is based on
the concept of working towards a minimum viable product (MVP); a
version of a product that has the main features needed to demonstrate
success, but which can be built with minimal effort and cost. Im-
portantly, therefore, an MVP does not represent a final product and thus
must be designed with foresight and with scope for necessary im-
provements in mind (Ries, 2011). Agile innovation underpins some of
the successes of the companies detailed in section 2.2, like SpaceX, in
which the rapid building and testing of prototypes is central to the
development process. Accordingly, SpaceX presents a real-world ap-
plication of agile innovation for hardware development10 (Rigby et al.,
2018).
The agile innovation approach dictates that prototypes are rela-
tively simple and amenable to relatively short development cycle times.
It is here that we find the major difference between fusion start-ups and
the current public fusion programmes. The long development times of
large government projects such as ITER and DEMO limit the use of the
latest technologies and new engineering methods, which thus limits
learning and agility. Developing technology in an agile manner, i.e.
through rapid iterations, permits learning while also affording the
possibility of integrating novel technologies at the next iteration or by
allowing for changes, for example in the market and policy environ-
ment, to influence development. Such a development approach reflects
a broader trend seen across multiple sectors over recent decades,
whereby large R&D-intensive companies have become aware that in-
ternal R&D does not always succeed in producing commercially at-
tractive inventions. In response, many have adopted an approach to R&
D that encompasses the concept of open innovation11 (Chesbrough and
Crowther, 2006). Open innovation fits with agile since it is defined as
the “combining [of] internal and external ideas as well as internal and
external paths to market to advance the development of new technologies”
(Chesbrough, 2003). In the context of fusion, large and complex devices
developed over long timescales suffer from technology redundancy,
whereby technology becomes out of date and thereby the mission
cannot adapt to emergent risks and opportunities. Accordingly, the
public fusion programme represents an approach that is not agile and
also one which operates largely as a closed innovation system.
Closely related to the agile approach is lean. Where agile originated
in software, lean evolved from manufacturing from the need to mini-
mise waste in terms of time, resource and effort. The Toyota Production
System characterised lean production in the early 1980s (see
(Liker, 2004)). However, its origins are traced back to Deming's process
of “plan-do-check-act” for continuous product improvement in 1950
(Neave, 1987). Lean production emphasises the reporting of failure in
order to learn from it. The approach has more recently been extended
from production methods to programme management and develop-
ment, and lean innovation as an approach has been utilised in multiple
contexts (see (Sehested and Sonnenberg, 2010) and Fig. 2). Lean in-
novation operates on many similar principles to agile, for example, in
the way that it promotes learning through discovery. Accordingly, agile
and lean innovation have developed in parallel, and they are often
perceived as synonymous (see (Ries, 2011)). However, while the two
approaches have different origins, they are complementary and inter-
twined in practice, as shown by the illustration in Fig. 2.
Agile and lean, adapted from (Ries, 2011, Beck et al., 2001,
Abrahamsson et al., 2002, Liker, 2004, Neave, 1987, Poppendieck and
Poppendieck, 2003), are compared and contrasted with the innovation
approach of fusion start-ups and public fusion programmes in Table 1.
While both are focused on mission-led hardware development, it is
evident from the comparison that fusion start-ups operate on agile and
lean principles and publicly-funded government-led programmes are
more linear and closed in the approach to innovation12.
One aspect of both agile and lean innovation that is fundamental for
8 Whilst our analogy of the Wright brothers is set in the context of innovation,
others in the fusion community have made a similar comparison, including The
American Security Project, scientists at Sandia National Laboratories (Sinars
et al., 2016) and at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Private commu-
nication with Dennis Whyte at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
November 2017), as well as entrepreneurs and scientists at both Common-
wealth Fusion Systems and Tokamak Energy Ltd.
9 The induced innovation model dictates that market demand drives tech-
nology development (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2015, Ruttan, 2000). The chainlink
model accounts for both technology-push and market-pull by exploring market
needs whilst also accounting for explicit feedback loops such that all stages of
the innovation process (research, design, production, and market) drive one
another (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
10 Also refer to NASA's “Pathfinder” mission, which adhered to agile and lean
innovation principles, see (Muirhead, 1997) and (Pearson, 2020).
11 Open innovation is founded upon the notion that valuable ideas from
outside of an organisation that influence the internal activity of an organisation
should be identified and determined, and vice-versa (Chesbrough, 2003).
12 Where the table provides a description of the fusion start-up approach, it
can also be perceived as a prescription or guide for fusion start-ups seeking
increased agility and leanness in their development approach.
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fusion start-ups is the approach to technology development. For agile, it
is the process of “build-measure-learn” towards an MVP, and for lean, it
is the process of “plan-do-check-act” for continuous product improve-
ment (Ries, 2011, Poppendieck and Poppendieck, 2003, Agan, 2014).
While the foundation of the agile approach is in the ability to iterate
quickly at low cost, for the lean approach it is less about speed and
more about enhancing efficiency and reducing waste. Therefore, it is
more apposite to employ the MVP concept from agile to help under-
stand the innovation approach for fusion start-ups. The equivalent MVP
for fusion start-ups is a device that is capable of demonstrating the
commercial viability of fusion. The fusion plasma in such a device must
controllably produce significantly more energy than is supplied to it
and must demonstrate that it can be scaled to a commercial device. For
a hardware-based technology development mission such as fusion,
whereby physical devices must be built, applying agile principles is not
straightforward, and thus an adapted approach is required. It is ap-
propriate, therefore, to show steps towards a fusion MVP as minimum
viable demonstrations (MVDs). MVDs can be designed as targets to de-
monstrate technology performance and to develop solutions to non-
technical problems that must be solved in parallel, e.g. materials supply
chains, regulation, infrastructure etc. The most important MVD on the
path to an MVP is the demonstration of first net power gain. It is ex-
pected that the fusion start-up (or start-ups) first to realise this MVD,
defined here as the breakthrough MVD, will see a surge of interest and
investment akin to that seen during the pioneer era of aviation sparked
by the first demonstration of controlled flight (Penrose, 1967). Im-
portantly, the breakthrough MVD must exist on a path that is scalable to
an MVP and subsequently to commercialisation, while simultaneously
being a goal that can be achieved as simply and as fast as possible
(Ries, 2011). Other MVDs can be identified as necessary to show the
advancement of critical technical issues for the realisation of the MVP.
Thus together, MVDs show overall progression towards the commercial
realisation of fusion. Fusion start-ups must therefore determine the
specific requirements for MVDs, and most importantly for a break-
through MVD, to plot progression to the realisation of an MVP. By being
aware of the pathway to commercialisation, it is possible to build an
understanding of what is required to address future challenges, and to
then plot the desired progression through those challenges.
2.4. Plotting a route to commercial fusion
Technology-intensive industries evolve and develop through the
different phases of innovation. The S-T-A-M model of industrial emer-
gence, shown in Fig. 3, plots the progression through phases from sci-
ence (S), to technology (T), to application (A), and then to market
(M)13. The phases of the S-T-A-M model are thus broadly analogous to
the innovation process. Accordingly, the transitions – explicitly denoted
by hyphens for emphasis – can be considered as key demonstration
points, which indicate the start of the next stage of the innovation
process. Plotting the trajectory of an industry or organisation, the S-T-
A-M model allows the key demonstration points to be outlined to enable
practical goals to be established. Importantly, however, while the
model appears as a linear progression, it must be viewed with the un-
derstanding that, as with all systems innovation models, the process is
dynamic (Phaal et al., 2011).
If the trajectory of fusion development is plotted in the S-T-A-M
model, then the science-technology (S-T) transition marks the demon-
stration of net power gain; the point at which the breakthrough MVD is
achieved. Referring to Fig. 4, for the public fusion programmes, the
breakthrough MVD, and thus the device to traverse the S-T transition is
ITER. The demonstration of useful energy production from a proto-
typical fusion reactor is a principal goal for the multiple DEMO projects
under consideration by various ITER members. DEMO, therefore, re-
presents the device that traverses the technology-application (T-A) and
is thus fusion's MVP. After that, an as-yet-unspecified first of a kind
(FOAK) commercial fusion reactor would demonstrate the capability to
overcome the application-market (A-M) transition. While public fusion
programmes and fusion start-ups are mainly focused on the first of these
transitions – the demonstration of net power gain – the S-T-A-M model
provides a clear idea of the steps to be taken on the route beyond this
point. It also provides the perspective that if commercialisation is the
Figure 2. The co-evolution of agile and lean innovation
13 The industrial emergence model can be further delineated into “S-T-A-M”
and “s-t-a-m” models (upper and lower case) to indicate the emergence of an
industry and the emergence of a single organisation, respectively (Phaal et al.,
2011). In this paper, for simplicity, we refer to this only as the S-T-A-M model to
describe the overall emergence of fusion towards commercialisation.
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goal, then it should be explicitly considered during all phases of a
process that follows a dynamic – not a linear – progression.
Further, it is essential to note that both government-funded and
private fusion efforts are currently in the “science” phase. Different
technical approaches to fusion are ostensibly at very different levels of
maturity, with tokamaks being the most advanced (Clery, 2019). The
public fusion programme is expected to pass the S-T transition of de-
monstrating net power gain via ITER around, or shortly after, 2035.
However, the subsequent T-A transition is not expected by DEMO until
sometime beyond 2050. A first commercial prototype to overcome the
transition to market will come at a later, as yet unknown, date. The
periods between each phase of development shown in the S-T-A-M
model are thus around 20 years. As a result, the realisation of com-
mercial fusion via public fusion programmes will not occur until around
2070 or later and, on the current trajectories, will be delivered via
large, complex, and expensive tokamak reactors. In contrast, fusion
start-ups aim to follow a path that leads to commercial fusion using
relatively small devices. They are, therefore, more capable of dynami-
cally adjusting the mission to ensure that some form of commerciali-
sation can occur in a shorter time. Thus, with a development approach
to build fast, learn fast, and, in some cases, to fail fast by virtue of their
higher acceptance of risk, fusion start-ups aim to accelerate the fusion
commercialisation process.
While fusion start-ups are focused on pursuing concepts that could
realise commercial fusion energy sooner, owing to the infancy of the
technology, as with government-led programmes, they are still focused
most closely on the early stages of the innovation process, i.e. on
technology R&D. This is typical of early-stage technology start-ups, see
(Liker, 2004), which tend to focus on the next deliverable rather than
long-term goals. As a result, the latter stages of the innovation process,
e.g. the identification of markets for the technology under development
and consequent angling of the technology towards those markets, are
less well developed (Kostoff and Schaller, 2001), (Liker, 2004),
(Garcia and Bray, 1997). Innovation management methods permit the
development of an innovation strategy that runs in parallel with the
early R&D stages, to enhance the chances of innovation success (see
(Pisano, 2015, Teece, 2010)). A variety of processes and tools are
available to support organisations in the management of innovation.
One such method is Technology Roadmapping, which enables the dif-
ferent elements in the programme to be clarified and managed, their
interdependences to be delineated, and the dynamic adjustment of the
programme to occur.
3. Technology Roadmapping
Methodologies for long-term planning, such as System Dynamics,
Scenario Planning and Technology Roadmapping have been widely
adopted to help governments, organisations and companies develop a
strategy to achieve long-term goals (Gordon, 1992, Porter et al., 2004,
Amer and Daim, 2010). Such methods necessarily take a high-level,
overview approach by determining the most effective near- and mid-
term activities that will deliver long-term goals, asking “where are we
now, where do we want to be, and how do we get there?” (Phaal et al.,
2001). Technology Roadmapping, hereafter simply referred to as
Figure 3. The S-T-A-M model of industrial emergence showing the pathway from scientific discovery to commercial realisation. Reproduced from (Phaal et al., 2011)
with permission of the author (Robert Phaal) and the University of Cambridge.
Figure 4. The public fusion programme in the context of the S-T-A-M model of industrial emergence.
R.J. Pearson, et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 158 (2020) 120064
8
roadmapping, is one such method that is particularly well suited to
technology development projects, such as fusion, due to its adaptability
and function to consider both technical and commercial aspects of de-
velopment simultaneously, and the interactions between these elements
(Albright and Kappel, 2003, Kostoff and Schaller, 2001, Phaal et al.,
2001, Garcia and Bray, 1997).
The product of roadmapping is a Technology Roadmap, hereafter
simply referred to as a roadmap. A roadmap is a multi-layered time-
based chart on which the evolution of a particular industry, market,
product or technology is plotted (Phaal et al., 2010). Roadmaps address
the “why”, “what”, “when”, “who”, “where” and “how”, colloquially
known as the “6 Ws”, which are used to guide scientific enquiry
(Sharp, 2002, Kerr et al., 2013, Kappel, 2001, Phaal, 2004). The time
function in a roadmap addresses “when”, while the “why”, “what” and
“how” are typically shown as layers. The “who” and “where” are em-
bedded in the details of a roadmap itself. The basic structure of a
roadmap, including links to the 6 Ws, is shown in Fig. 5.
Both the process of creating a roadmap, i.e. roadmapping, and a
roadmap itself have several useful functions. Roadmapping is carried
out by individuals, typically from different functions of an organisation,
who work together collectively to develop ideas and strategies towards
a common goal (Phaal et al., 2010, Phaal, 2004, Zurcher and
Kostoff, 1997). A roadmap, on the other hand, shows the steps an or-
ganisation needs to take to achieve its stated outcomes and goals,
thereby facilitating the development of strategy (Phaal et al., 2010,
International Energy Agency 2014, Winebrake, 2004). A roadmap
serves as a visual tool to facilitate the identification of potential chal-
lenges, opportunities and risks on the intended future path that may
affect the chosen strategy (Phaal et al., 2010, Garcia and Bray, 1997).
Even though the future is uncertain and cannot be predicted with high
accuracy, it is possible to plan for the identified path (or paths) as they
are currently envisaged. Roadmapping typically starts with a planning
stage that defines the vision and goals for the application, as well as the
scope of the activity (Phaal et al., 2010, International Energy Agency
2014, Winebrake, 2004, Phaal et al., 2001). By defining a vision at the
outset, and by understanding the current position in relation to that
vision, the potential forward-path – or paths – can be plotted. After that,
appropriate near-term decisions can be made, and resources allocated,
based on the identified needs of the path, i.e. a strategy can be devel-
oped (Phaal et al., 2001).
Companies or organisations engaged in complex technology devel-
opment inevitably operate in a changing environment where external
developments beyond their control occur and potentially influence the
intended future path and even the long-term goal(s). There will also
inevitably be discoveries, both positive and negative, that impact in-
ternal activities and may affect the long-term goal(s) and the planned
forward path. To be effective, a roadmap must be updated to take such
developments into account. The time interval between updates will
depend on the timescale of changes in the external and internal factors.
Such updates are carried out by continuously iterating a roadmap, often
supported by a dedicated workshop, which commonly forms an integral
part of the roadmapping process (International Energy Agency 2014,
Phaal et al., 2001, Phaal, 2004). Workshops provide a physical space for
communication between participants from different parts of an orga-
nisation to produce, contribute to, or review the intended future path as
well as for collective strategizing (Albright and Kappel, 2003). Once a
roadmap is developed, different versions of it can be developed to show
different information and to communicate with different audiences and
stakeholders (Albright and Kappel, 2003, Kappel, 2001, Kerr and
Phaal, 2015). For example, derivative roadmaps can be created for
potential investors, strategic planners, senior management or technical
teams, or those responsible for intellectual property and patents and
those dealing with public outreach (i.e. marketing).
Roadmapping has previously been deployed to support space sector
programmes (see (NASA 2014)) as well as the development of fusion
(see section 4, step 2). However, these instances represent an applica-
tion of the method to help guide overall industry direction – and can be
classified as “sector-level roadmaps”, see (Phaal et al., 2009) – rather
than as roadmapping to actively support the management of innovation
and the commercialisation process for a limited application. It has
previously been applied to agile innovation, including to support agile
management in manufacturing firms (Carlos et al., 2018) and to enable
agile software development (Ozaki et al., 2015). Similarly, a road-
mapping framework has been developed specifically to support agile
start-ups, which has been applied extensively, see (Leffingwell, 2018).
However, the focus has been on its utility to support agile management
in established organisations pursuing incremental innovation rather
than for actively supporting agile innovation in disruptive grand-scale
missions such as in fusion or the space sector. Roadmapping potentially
provides a useful method to support such missions and exists as a cri-
tical gap in its applications.
Fusion start-ups are pursuing programmes that entail highly com-
plex hardware development with an ambitious vision and are subject to
significant uncertainty and risk. Such uncertainty and risk can be
managed through appropriate organisational design and practices
(McCurdy, 2001). Roadmapping, as a tested research method, as well as
a functional management tool, can be deployed to support the de-
termination and execution of the best path forward. The combination of
these factors makes action research, in this case, via a case study, the
most suitable approach to deploy the method. The following sections
detail the specific roadmapping process and resulting roadmap devel-
oped for Tokamak Energy Ltd as a fusion start-up case study. The
process is designed to support the approach outlined in section 2, and
specifically to facilitate high-level programme planning, the manage-
ment of the innovation process, and to enhance communication of the
future strategy.
Figure 5. Typical Technology Roadmap Structure, including links to four of the 6 Ws (shown as “know-when”, “know-why”, “know-what”, and “know-how”).
Reproduced from (Phaal et al., 2001) with permission of the author (Robert Phaal) and the University of Cambridge.
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4. Tokamak Energy's Goal and the Production of a First-pass
Technology Roadmap
4.1. Tokamak Energy's vision and mission
Tokamak Energy's goal is to demonstrate the commercial viability of
fusion energy in the near-term using a compact spherical tokamak in
which the magnets are made using HTS (Sykes et al., 2018,
Costley, 2019, Windridge, 2019). A schematic of a spherical tokamak
concept, similar to that envisaged by Tokamak Energy, is shown in
Fig. 6. A spherical tokamak is a particular configuration of three of the
principal tokamak parameters – size, magnetic field and shape – and
appears to be particularly suitable for compact devices. In shape, it
represents a “cored apple” rather than a “ring doughnut” which is the
shape of a conventional tokamak. The spherical tokamak has been
found to have benefits in terms of plasma performance, although it does
have unique engineering challenges (Sykes et al., 2018). If these can be
solved, the improved performance combined with HTS magnets is ex-
pected to open up a pathway to compact fusion devices of high per-
formance (Costley, 2019).
In brief, Tokamak Energy's programme consists of building and
operating a series of spherical tokamaks of increasing performance to-
wards the stated goal and, where necessary, carrying out parallel R&D
on key tokamak components, particularly HTS magnets, the inner ra-
diation shield for the central solenoid and the divertor, which are key
components, as labelled in Fig. 6. Many of the technical challenges for
the fusion devices are similar to those being addressed in public fusion
programmes and solutions being developed in those programmes can be
used if the development is sufficiently advanced for the Tokamak En-
ergy schedule. Spin-off opportunities that arise from the company R&D
are identified and developed if commercially viable. Furthermore, all
commercial aspects are kept under review and can influence the overall
direction of Tokamak Energy's programme. The company has a highly
skilled team of in-house scientists and engineers, as well as external
contractors and consultants. It has collaborations with fusion labora-
tories and universities worldwide. The experimental work is undertaken
in an innovative fusion laboratory set up in Oxfordshire, UK.
Tokamak Energy's primary goal requires demonstration of net en-
ergy production whilst accounting for the energy consumed in the
balance of plant (engineering fusion gain Qeng >1) and having all the
basic core components sufficiently developed to demonstrate scalability
to a commercial fusion reactor. While precise engineering specifications
of such a tokamak cannot currently be determined due to technical and
commercial uncertainties, target high-level performance specifications
can be identified. The tokamak must produce net energy controllably; it
must be compact, easy to build, and be safe and reliable in operation;
and it must demonstrate scalability to a commercial product (i.e. a
FOAK commercial fusion reactor). The goal is well defined, but the
steps required to achieve it are less so. The phases of innovation de-
tailed in the S-T-A-M model (section 2) are useful as a means to provide
structure for understanding the current position and required steps to
commercialisation, i.e. to determine “how we get there”. By setting
Tokamak Energy's mission in the context of the S-T-A-M model, we can
define the transitions that must be overcome on the path to achieving
the company's goal. The current operating tokamak, ST-40, is advan-
cing the understanding of several fundamental plasma physics and
technical aspects, effectively reducing the risk of some technical ele-
ments that are important for the design and construction of a FOAK
reactor. The next planned device, ST-F1, is aiming to demonstrate net
power gain in the fusion plasma (Qfus > 1) and will, therefore, over-
come the S-T transition, realising Tokamak Energy's Wright brothers’
moment”. As such, ST-F1 represents the breakthrough MVD for Tokamak
Energy. The device to overcome the T-A transition (the MVP) is ST-E1,
for which the technology development will mostly follow, but in some
cases overlap, with ST-F1. ST-E1 is thus intended to demonstrate the
commercial viability of fusion energy. Naturally, challenges will remain
beyond ST-E1; for example, issues such as financing (for construction),
international licensing, scaling up supply chains and in the develop-
ment of higher-performance materials to allow longer component life-
times must all be considered in addition to reactor technology devel-
opment. Steps to deal with these aspects are under development at
Tokamak Energy.
4.2. Production of a first-pass roadmap
Technology roadmaps are typically developed through a multi-stage
process. For the application to Tokamak Energy, we found it helpful to
develop this via two principal stages: First, develop the basic structure,
scope and organisation of the roadmap. After that, the technical as-
pects, internal links and content are developed to yield a “first-pass”
roadmap. The first-pass Roadmap was produced through four steps, as
shown in Fig. 7).
Step 1: Define the scope and objectives of the roadmap
The roadmap is intended to give an overview of the entire devel-
opment programme towards the defined goal. However, it is also
developed as a tool to assist with the management of technology
development programme according to the agile innovation model.
The roadmap must be consistent with the company strategic busi-
ness plan. Hence the setting of goals and objectives for the road-
mapping activity was carried out in close consultation with senior
management.
Step 2: Select reference roadmapping processes
Technology roadmapping is a well-developed technique, and dif-
ferent roadmapping processes have been developed. Several road-
mapping processes were particularly useful as a reference point for
Figure 6. Concept diagram of Tokamak Energy's spherical tokamak using HTS magnets.
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the approach developed here. Specifically, we used The Institute for
Manufacturing (University of Cambridge) T-Plan (Phaal et al.,
2001), EIRMA's (European Industrial Research Management Asso-
ciation) roadmapping process (European Industrial Research
Management Association (EIRMA) 1997), Sandia National Labora-
tories roadmapping for strategic business development (Garcia and
Bray, 1997), the International Energy Agency roadmapping process
(International Energy Agency 2014), and the guide to roadmapping
for the U.S. DoE Environmental Management (United States
Department of Energy 2000). For the development of the roadmap
structure, we used Motorola's car radio roadmap (Willyard and
McClees, 1987), Lucent Technologies corporation roadmaps
(Albright and Kappel, 2003), and the Office for Naval Research
guide to modelling roadmaps (Zurcher and Kostoff, 1997). For the
organisation of the workshops, we used the T-Plan framework
(Phaal et al., 2001), the International Energy Agency roadmapping
process (International Energy Agency 2014) and the LEGO Group
roadmapping for management (Kerr et al., 2017).
There have been several roadmaps developed in support of the
public fusion programme (see (Phaal, 2011)), but none of these are
particularly useful for application to fusion start-ups. Probably the
most developed is the European fusion roadmap which outlines the
expected route to commercialisation, mostly using tokamaks, for the
public fusion programme in Europe. Two iterations of the roadmap
have been published, five years apart, with the most recent in 2018
(Eurofusion 2018). While the roadmap provides insights on the re-
quired direction of travel, detailing high-level objectives, scientific
milestones and broad technology development needs – specifically
those related to ITER and its satellite R&D programmes towards
DEMO – it does not define the “why” or “how”. It is not clear how
the roadmap aggregates all the technologies that need to be devel-
oped, and it does not describe how commercial drivers are used to
drive technology development. Therefore, the European fusion
roadmap represents a technology-push system and also reflects the
underlying linear model of innovation upon which the public pro-
gramme operates, as outlined previously in section 2.1. It is not
useful as a foundation to support the development of a roadmap for
fusion start-ups.
Step 3: Determine the basic structure of the roadmap
The current position of the development programme and the defined
vision or goal(s) essentially define the boundaries of the roadmap.
The boundaries are most instructively outlined using the S-T-A-M
model, and, in particular, the transitions define the significant steps
in the programme: the Qfus > 1 (the breakthrough MVD) and the
Qeng > 1 (the MVP) milestones. The approximate timescale is thus
displayed at the top of the roadmap and the devices; ST40, ST-F1
and ST-E1, and the parallel R&D on critical technologies such as the
HTS magnets, are major elements of the development programme
and are displayed on the upper layers. To put depth into these ele-
ments the questions “where are we now?”, “where do we want to
be?” and “how can we get there?” must be addressed. It is con-
venient to use a 3 × 3 matrix to determine a skeleton before loading
the roadmap (see Fig. 8). For the first-pass roadmap, only place-
holders are needed. The essential point is to ensure that all scope is
included.
Step 4: Develop the layers of the Technology Roadmap
Typically, the layers of a roadmap represent market, product and
technology (see Fig. 5 in section 3). The “Machines & Projects”
layer, as detailed in Step 3, shows what is required to build and test
the technology to be developed and thus essentially answers the
Figure 7. The process to develop a first-pass roadmap for Tokamak Energy (steps 1 to 4)
Figure 8. The 3 × 3 matrix used to determine the basic structure of the
roadmap per step 3 of the process. Questions on the y-axis can be adapted
dependent on the scope of the roadmap being developed. Adapted from
(Phaal et al., 2010) with permission of the author and the University of Cam-
bridge.
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questions related to “what”. However, given the scale of the tech-
nology development for Tokamak Energy, the “how” is separated
into two distinct layers. “Technology Gap Issues” identifies areas in
the state of technology development where there is considerable
uncertainty, and further development is needed (as technologies are
at low Technology Readiness Levels, see 5.1.5). “Resources & Cap-
abilities” details the auxiliary support or logistics that are needed to
close the gaps. The lower layers go on to deal with the enabling
facilities, resources and logistics. A layer detailing “Strategic Mile-
stones” represents the exploitation and development of commercial
activities; in roadmapping terms, it represents the “why”. Strategic
milestones are set by investors and business leaders, and thus al-
though the structure of the roadmap is predominantly focused on R
&D, it is tethered to commercial drivers. Thereby the basic structure
and outline content of the roadmap is determined, as seen in Fig. 9.
5. The Tokamak Energy Roadmap: Content Development and
Review
Considerably more depth in the roadmap is required in order for it
to fulfil its intended purpose. In the first instance, we developed content
in consultation with key staff within Tokamak Energy. Subsequently,
the content was reviewed and further developed in two dedicated re-
view workshops involving key staff at Tokamak Energy. Further con-
sultations with experts, as well as analysis, were undertaken on specific
TGIs via focus workshops and the use of analysis tools, respectively. The
steps involved are summarized in Fig. 10.
5.1. Content development
At the upper levels, the company's strategic milestones, the main
stages in the existing and planned fusion devices, and planned steps in
the parallel in-house R&D programmes are shown (see Fig. 9). Of
course, detailed plans exist for these machines and projects, usually in
the form of Gantt charts. The high-level information in the roadmap
represents key steps in these plans. The initial loading of the roadmap
for these levels mainly involved importing existing information.
5.1.1. Technology Gap issues
The specific challenges in technical understanding or technology
development that must be overcome for Tokamak Energy to realise
commercial fusion can be broken down into specific Technology Gap
Issues (TGIs). These are areas of physics or technology where there is
presently considerable uncertainty or lack of knowledge, and where
that leads to uncertainty in the design and performance of the planned
first-of-a-kind fusion reactor. In other words, the Technology Readiness
Level (TRL) of some of the technologies needed for ST-E1 are currently
low (see 5.1.5). More information and knowledge, and possibly dedi-
cated R&D, is needed to reduce the uncertainties.
Dividing the overall development challenge into separate TGIs is
consistent with an agile approach to innovation. Even though ST-E1
will ultimately integrate all technical aspects, certain problems can
initially be solved independently, and some decisions can be deferred
until later in order to make faster progress in the near-term. The
strategy to develop technology in parallel is analogous to NASA's
Mercury & Gemini programmes in which technology and technical
know-how were progressed concurrently via separate development
streams to support the Apollo mission to land a man on the moon.
For Tokamak Energy, 15 TGIs were initially identified, and most fall
into three distinct categories: physics, engineering, and other technology
issues that relate to the execution of the programme. The issues are
summarised in Table 2. Although each TGI was defined independently
and specifically for Tokamak Energy, unsurprisingly there are sig-
nificant overlaps with previously defined technical gaps from other
tokamak fusion programmes, for example, those detailed in (Donné
et al., 2017) and (Zarnstoff and Goldston, 2017). Several of the TGIs are
of relevance to non-tokamak fusion approaches, too.
By definition, the resolution of all TGIs is essential to achieving
mission success. However, TGIs vary in nature and difficulty of re-
solution. For example, TGI #1 (Energy confinement time) requires a
certain level of technical and plasma performance to be achieved and a
corresponding understanding of the physics to be confident that the
required net power gain can be achieved. In contrast, TGI #9 (Fusion
materials) requires the characterisation of the performance of existing
materials in as yet unexplored ranges and possibly the development of
new materials. Several TGIs will have a relatively high impact on the
feasibility and design of the intended future fusion device (ST-E1). For
example, if in order to achieve the required energy confinement time a
toroidal field of 6 T (Tesla) is needed, this will have a significant impact
on the design of the tokamak. In comparison, a field of only 3 T may be
easier to engineer and may thus result in the realisation of a smaller
reactor. These TGIs are described as “high-leverage” , and currently,
Figure 9. Close-up of step 4 in the production of the first-pass roadmap for Tokamak Energy and the basic structure and outline content of the roadmap
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four have been identified for Tokamak Energy: #1 (Energy confinement
time), #5 (HTS magnets), #6 (Divertor) and #7 (Radiation shield for
central column).
In some cases, the technical challenges can be further broken down,
and sub-TGIs created; similar to the sub-layers described in
(Phaal, 2004). Some of the TGIs where it is not essential to resolve them
in the near term, for example, TGI #12 (Tritium breeding and self-
sufficiency) are likely to become high-leverage and to be divided into
sub-TGIs in the future. However, all TGIs that can be identified at this
stage are included in the roadmap to ensure that some level of devel-
opment activity is underway at present. As the development progresses,
other TGIs may arise. However, in general, it is expected that the
number will diminish with time as individual TGIS are resolved.
5.1.2. TGI Analysis
Since the TGIs are main elements of the development programme,
they were subject to a more in-depth investigation. A careful assessment
of the current level of development was carried out; typically, this in-
volved a review of the status of public tokamak programmes and its
relevance to the Tokamak Energy programme. The activity was pri-
marily an analysis and review exercise. In some cases, it is clear that
dedicated R&D is required because results are not likely to be available
on the needed timescale. In these cases, dedicated internal development
programmes have been formed. Relevant external documents, particu-
larly in the form of journal articles and reports from national labora-
tories, as well as input from subject matter expert consultants, were also
gathered and analysed. The documents created through this process
were used as templates to capture content to be translated into the
roadmap and to form a library of supporting material.
5.1.3. TGI interdependencies (linkage grids)
Many of the technical aspects of TGIs are inextricably linked, and
these linkages must be captured. For example, the divertor (TGI #6),
the radiation shield for the central column (TGI #7), and access for
diagnostics and heating beams (TGI #4) all require space and thus can
affect the ability to breed tritium (TGI #12) as well as the ability to
carry out remote handling (TGI #10). Although tritium breeding is not
required for ST-F1, it will be essential for ST-E1, and so early-stage
solutions for ST-F1 that can be extrapolated to ST-E1 are favoured.
Linkage grids are an effective tool for capturing these links and are
commonly adopted in roadmapping to identify interdependencies and
integrate roadmap layers (Phaal et al., 2001, Phaal et al., 2005). For the
first-pass roadmap developed for Tokamak Energy, linkage grids fa-
cilitated the understanding of high-level dependencies across TGIs, to
ensure that disparate and parallel technology development streams will
be developed with integration in mind, as shown in Fig. 11. The lin-
kages – shown as red dots – are quantified in detail for the Tokamak
Energy programme.
5.1.4. TGIs: Methods of Resolution
To progress towards a point where ST-E1 can be designed and built
with confidence, a solution path needs to be identified, and a strategy
developed to resolve each TGI. Various methods of resolution are pos-
sible. For example, for physics TGIs, much relevant information can be
learnt from the operational programmes of existing and future spherical
tokamak experiments such as MAST-U at Culham Centre for Fusion
Energy, UK, and NSTX-U at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, US. It
may just be a matter of importing the techniques developed in those
programmes. Similarly, some of the required technology is under de-
velopment in the numerous existing external R&D programmes, la-
boratories supporting public fusion programmes, or even from other
industries. For other TGIs, for example, the development of HTS mag-
nets, dedicated in-house R&D is needed due to comparatively little re-
levant external development. In this area, there is also the possibility to
develop Intellectual Property (IP), which is, of course, of significant
importance for all private organisations developing technology. For
some TGIs, work with collaborators or commissioned work by external
contractors may resolve the issue. For less urgent, typically longer-term
TGIs, a “watching brief” may be sufficient; whereby relevant external R
&D is tracked, including for developments in sectors beyond fusion. For
each TGI, a preferred method of resolution was identified and displayed
in the roadmap.
The involvement of external collaborators, which are heavily in-
volved in some TGIs, helps foster the creation and nurturing of an in-
novation orchard for fusion start-ups. An innovation orchard is a concept
whereby companies seek collaboration with universities, industry, and
government laboratories to leverage expertise, equipment or ideas to
support inbound innovation on technology development (Singer and
Bonvillian, 2017). From the perspective of fusion start-ups, inbound
innovation from collaborators in their innovation orchard can yield
significant value at relatively low cost. From the perspective of poten-
tial collaborators, start-ups should be viewed as “industry” driving the
Figure 10. The roadmap development process, derived from application to Tokamak Energy (the inputs and outputs can be altered depending on the application and
needs)
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requirements for new R&D or for utilising existing knowledge and ex-
pertise, rather than as competition.
5.1.5. Technology Readiness Levels
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) as developed by NASA to assess
technology development for space technology are an established metric
for assessing and displaying progress in the development of technology
(Mankins, 1995). They assess demonstrable technology maturity or
“readiness” on a scale of 1 to 9, whereby TRL 1 is given to a technology
in which only basic principles are understood with degrees of pro-
gression towards TRL 9, which represents that full operation in the
relevant environment has been demonstrated. TRLs combine well with
the process of roadmapping as they provide a metric of “where we are
now” on the path to “where we want to be”. For Tokamak Energy, TRLs
are used to measure the progress of technology development in the
roadmap and as a means to display the current state of development
succinctly. Assigning a TRL for a given TGI is a subjective exercise; it
requires expert analysis and review. Of course, for the resolution of a
single TGI, it is not simply one individual component that must be
developed, but the integration of several different components and
systems. For this System Readiness Levels (SRLs) can be used to de-
termine the maturity of combined technologies. The assignment of TRLs
Table 2
Definitions of the Technology Gap Issues identified for Tokamak Energy.
Type Technology Gap Issue (TGI) Description
Physics #1 Energy confinement time The scaling of the energy confinement time with device parameters, particularly size, field and shape, is a
high impact element in the design of tokamak fusion reactors, see (Costley, 2019). The scaling for
conventional aspect ratio tokamaks is well developed, but the scaling for spherical tokamaks requires
further development and validation, see (Buxton et al., 2019).
#2 High gain and burning plasma physics A high-gain plasma (Qfus > 3) will incur self-heating (where the fusion plasma heats itself due to alpha
radiation). Potentially as yet experimentally unseen plasma physics phenomena could occur and
significantly affect plasma behaviour and performance (positively or negatively).
#3 Plasma control Long-pulse, steady-state plasmas are essential for a viable fusion reactor. Plasma ramp-up, ramp-down and
control (for instabilities and disruption mitigation or avoidance) must be understood, designed for and, in
the case of disruption mitigation, demonstrated. See (Gryaznevich and Sykes, 2017).
#4 Auxiliary plasma systems (heating, current drive,
fuelling, & diagnostics)
Customised technology is required for heating, current drive (non-bootstrap fraction), fuel injection, and
for making key in-vessel and plasma measurements (diagnostics) for burning plasma operation.
Engineering #5 High-Temperature Superconducting (HTS)
magnets
Development of HTS for practical use in fusion is limited. Technology must be developed in key areas:
electromechanical design (stresses, joints, cables and connections), design for quench protection, design of
cooling systems, design for use under neutron irradiation (including to understand the level of shielding
required, which impacts device size). Additionally, the global supply of HTS tape is limited, and the
performance of existing supply varies. Also, see (Bruzzone, 2010).
#6 Exhaust power handling (Divertor) Tokamaks must have sufficient power handling capability to handle the power exhausted from the plasma
(via the divertor). Although various divertor designs have been developed in public fusion programmes, a
design suitable for a spherical tokamak must be developed, see (Costley, 2019).
#7 Inner radiation shield for the central column The geometry of a spherical tokamak necessitates a relatively thin central column. A dedicated radiation
(neutron) shield must be designed to protect the HTS magnets in the central column, which in turn impacts
minimum device size. A functional design, materials capable of handling high heat loads and neutron loads,
as well as an effective cooling mechanism, must be developed. See (Costley, 2019, Windsor et al., 2015,
Windsor et al., 2017, Windsor and Morgan, 2017).
#8 Plasma-material interactions Plasma-facing and in-vessel components (e.g. the first wall) could be damaged due to energetic particle
bombardment, in particular by a high fusion neutron flux which will limit component lifetime. Materials
must be developed to achieve the desired performance.
#9 Fusion materials The development of fusion materials is essential for many components and systems. Structures inside a
fusion reactor will be subject to high fusion neutron flux and high heat loads, as well as thermal ramping
(causing fatigue) and large temperature gradients (inducing stress), which may limit operational lifetime.
Suitable materials must be selected, developed through R&D and qualified for use in the fusion
environment.
#10 Remote handling and maintenance Components (e.g. divertor, first wall, blanket) in a DT fusion reactor will become radioactive after reactor
operation due to neutron irradiation. Repair and replacement must be carried out by remote handling.
Dedicated technology must be developed for the spherical tokamak.
#11 Tritium handling, recycling & supply Specialised systems and procedures are required to handle and recycle tritium fuel. Challenges in handling
tritium, such as retention in the first wall and the development of a water detritiation system, require
solutions. The supply of tritium from an external source, alongside the associated safety, regulatory and
licensing aspects must also be considered, see (Pearson et al., 2018).
#12 Tritium breeding & self-sufficiency Fusion reactors must breed tritium via a lithium-based breeding blanket. A blanket must be designed to
produce more than one tritium atom for every neutron produced by the fusion reaction and to extract the
produced tritium effectively. A dedicated blanket design for a spherical tokamak is required, as, in
particular, a spherical tokamak does not permit breeding in the central column due to space restrictions,
thus impacting minimum device size. Also, see (Menard et al., 2016, Pearson, 2020).
Other #13 Energy generation The blanket described in TGI #11 must transfer neutron energy to thermal energy, which can be converted
into useful electrical energy or other process heat applications. The tritium breeding blanket and energy
generation mechanism are thus inherently linked. For applications such as hydrogen production, new ex-
vessel systems must also be developed.
#14 Economics of fusion for energy While relatively small spherical tokamak reactors may be technically feasible, for the commercialisation of
fusion they must also be commercially viable. Assessments of the commercial feasibility of spherical
tokamak power plant, possibly through a modular approach, is required to optimise performance
parameters, especially as regards the power and size, see (Chuyanov and Gryaznevich, 2017). Although
electricity generation is a key focus, the economic viability of other commercial pathways should be
considered.
#15 Licensing, regulation and safety The location of a suitable site, the development of a suitable regulatory framework, and securing necessary
construction, operation, and decommissioning licenses represents a lengthy, multi-stage process. Engaging
with regulators at an early stage will ensure that fusion systems are designed appropriately to follow
procedures, thereby ensuring the end product, i.e. the ST-E1 FOAK fusion reactor, can be built and
operated.
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and SRLs and their integration with the roadmapping process is an
ongoing exercise for Tokamak Energy.
5.1.6. Commercial aspects
As explained in Section 2, a key feature of agile innovation is that
commercial aspects are always under development and review, and the
technical development programme can be adjusted in response to
commercial aspects – the “technology push” and “commercial pull” of
agile innovation. Thus, work on commercial aspects is part of the To-
kamak Energy programme and so is included in the roadmap. Mostly,
there are two types of commercial activity: those that relate to the
principal goal – the demonstration of the commercial viability of fusion
energy – and those that relate to the commercial exploitation of spin-
offs, which can arise from in-house R&D activity. For the former, on-
going studies of the economics of fusion energy are part of the devel-
opment programme, see (Chuyanov and Gryaznevich, 2017). For the
latter, opportunities are sought to exploit the IP that the company has
secured through its in-house R&D programme, appropriately protected
by patents. Spin-off technology success and associated revenue streams
are a key part of the fusion start-up business model.
5.1.7. Resources & capabilities
Closely linked to the technical programme is the development of
resources necessary to enable progress with the technical elements.
Significant financial investment; a workforce of professionals, de-
signers, technicians and administrators; various hardware; and, in some
cases, novel materials for which considerations regarding supply chain
and specialised manufacturing processes, amongst other things, are
necessary. These aspects are displayed in the lower layer of the
roadmap.
5.2. Developing the Roadmap through Workshops
The bulk of the roadmap development thus far described was car-
ried out by a small dedicated roadmapping team , alongside consulta-
tions with appropriate experts. The involvement of experts and staff
with different elements of the programme will naturally add content
and accuracy to the roadmap and build consensus within the team.
Workshops are typically deployed to capture such contributions,
whereby a team works collectively to identify and develop the best path
towards the specified goal(s) (Albright and Kappel, 2003, Amer and
Daim, 2010, Phaal, 2004). Workshops were used to develop the
roadmap for Tokamak Energy (see Fig. 10).
5.2.1. Tokamak Energy workshop overview, scope and schedule
Two half-day team workshops were run spaced apart by about six
months, the first in May 2017 and the second in November 2017. The
scope of the first workshop was to validate the structure and content of
the first-pass roadmap. Key staff generated ideas as a collective effort,
mainly developing the scope of future R&D projects and the high-level
performance requirements of future machines, which is driven by an
understanding of the TGIs that must be developed. The second work-
shop focused on identifying methods of resolution for the four high-
leverage TGIs. Typical outputs of the workshops are shown in Fig. 10.
Following workshops, action reports were produced outlining the main
activities from the workshop with actions to progress the development.
Action reports were disseminated internally within Tokamak Energy
along with an updated roadmap with agreed content and structural
changes.
5.2.2. Workshop participants
For effective roadmapping, workshops should involve participants
from several functions of an organisation to reflect both the technically-
oriented and commercially-oriented viewpoints. In high-tech start-ups,
in particular, there is usually an abundance of technical knowledge.
However, to enable effective innovation in such environments, there is
a need to complement scientific minds with more commercial and en-
trepreneurial minds (Tura et al., 2017, Park, 2005). The workshops at
Tokamak Energy involved between 8 and 10 participants guided by two
facilitators (two of the authors of this paper; Pearson and Costley). The
participants had a range of roles in the company – scientific, technical,
commercial development, planning etc – but given the technical nature
of the challenge, there was a concentration on scientific and technical
aspects. Accordingly, the participants were divided into three cate-
gories: executives, technical managers and technical experts, as shown
by the examples in Fig. 12.
Figure 11. Technology Gap Issue Linkage Grid
Figure 12. Roles of roadmapping workshop participants at Tokamak Energy
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5.2.3. Workshop activities
Both workshops followed the same broad structure, which can be
distilled as six key steps, detailed below:
1 Introduction: Objectives and intended outcomes for the workshop
are delivered by the facilitator, alongside opening remarks from an
executive - typically, the CEO.
2 Group activity: Participants are divided into three groups to review
the roadmap (for the first workshop, this is a review of the first-pass
roadmap). Each group contains one participant from each of the
functions outlined in Fig. 12 to enable cross-cutting discussion. The
group reviews the roadmap per the workshop objectives, providing
new ideas or new data by interacting with a printed copy of the
roadmap. As an example, in workshop 2 for Tokamak Energy, par-
ticipants reviewed high-leverage TGIs one-by-one, recording ideas
on post-it notes.
3 Plenary activity: groups discuss their ideas with other groups,
moderated by the facilitator(s). Ideas and data are collated and re-
corded towards a consensus.
4 Iteration: steps 2 and 3 are repeated as many times as appropriate
until objectives have been achieved. Typically, this is performed by
reviewing one layer of the roadmap at a time.
5 Summary: a final plenary is held to identify the most important
outcomes of the workshop to inform the generation of the action
report (see 5.2.1).
6 Consolidation: required changes to the roadmap, alongside key
outcomes and actions, are reviewed by the roadmapping facilitator
(s), and agreed with senior managers or executives, and draft
changes are issued.
5.2.4. Focus workshops
Many roadmapping processes depend on workshops for idea gen-
eration. Start-ups are constrained in terms of personnel, time, and re-
source. Accordingly, the process was adapted for the Tokamak Energy
application such that workshops were a space for collective review and
consensus on strategy. In parallel, separate “focus workshops” were
deployed to provide an alternative means to generate technical content,
which involved semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts
(per (Harrell and Bradley, 2009)). Focus workshops can, therefore, be
considered as a tool akin to those outlined in sections 5.1.2 to 5.1.5. For
Tokamak Energy, focus workshops were used to develop content for
TGIs by leveraging ideas and knowledge from consultants.
After the two workshops, and with input from several focus
workshops, the Tokamak Energy roadmap and process was developed
and embedded within the company. In mid-2018, the roadmapping
process -developed as presented in this paper - was transitioned to a
senior manager within the company. The process was developed suffi-
ciently to be used as a tool for practical management. However, sug-
gested steps for the future development of the process were also pro-
vided, which are described in section 7. During the deployment of the
roadmapping process, the roadmap started to inform management and
be used for strategy development, which is detailed in section 6.
5.3. Developing the Technology Roadmap outside of workshops
Many roadmapping processes make heavy use of workshops. The
core content of the roadmap for Tokamak Energy was developed
through focus workshops as well as through TGI analysis, the devel-
opment of additional linkage grids and incorporation of TRLs, as out-
lined in section 5.1. However, much of the roadmap content was de-
veloped between workshops, and workshops were instead used as a
dedicated space for review, adjustment, and building consensus.
A particularly important activity was the further development of the
TGIs and particularly those related to longer-term challenges.
Uncertainties associated with longer-term TGIs can have an impact on
current and planned near-term technology development or designs.
Ideas or data from internal and external experts provided greater depth
to the TGI analysis, particularly via focus workshops as a means to elicit
that information, and thus the roadmap was appropriately updated.
The use of linkage grids was expanded to show relationships be-
tween layers beyond just technical links: for example, investor-set
milestones, machines and projects, and resources and capabilities were
all linked via additional grids, as shown in Fig. 13. Because of pro-
grammatic priorities, different layers of the roadmap effectively “push”
and “pull” one another. The commercial “pull” of strategic milestones,
derived from the business plan, sets targets for machines and projects
and thus informs technology development. In the opposite direction,
the limits of technological capability or the rate of development can
“push” the timescales for machines, which can consequently impact
higher-level milestones. Linkages between TGIs and machines are
especially important. They enable the specification of the machines and
their experimental programmes, and the results obtained in the oper-
ating phases, to address the key technical uncertainties. Similarly,
linkage grids can be used to evaluate the resources and capabilities
required to develop future TGIs. For example, for a currently non-
essential TGI; remote handling technology (TGI #10), it provides initial
Figure 13. Linkage grids for the Tokamak Energy Technology Roadmap, to analyse crosslinks between layers. Based on Fig. 6 in (Phaal and Muller, 2009), adapted
with permission.
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estimates of the cost, materials required, site license conditions, and IP
opportunities; thereby effectively resource-loading - or even "opportu-
nity-loading" (showing where innovation could take place) - the high-
level TGI development path shown on the roadmap . The linkage grids
developed, therefore, add depth to the content of the roadmap, improve
consistency between the layers and enhance the overall efficiency and
robustness of the intended programme.
5.4. The Tokamak Energy Technology Roadmap
The results of the roadmapping process are captured in the full
technology roadmap shown in Fig. 14. The time horizon shows the
short-, medium- and long-term activities with an expanded time scale in
the near term where naturally there is more detail in the programme
elements. Some TGIs have sub-TGIs providing a higher level of detail,
especially on issues that require a higher level of focus. Other TGIs are
less developed (as before, typically, those relevant to the longer-term).
The roadmap incorporates colours and shapes as a key design feature
following the method in (Albright and Kappel, 2003). Colours illustrate
a link between activities shown in TGIs to a specific project or machine.
Similarly, the shape of the box around an element illustrates the ex-
pected method of resolution for any particular TGI activity, which al-
lows the roadmap to show collaborators or work ongoing elsewhere.
The symbols shown in the resources and capabilities layer provide a
visual aid for the ease of viewing of the high-level resource require-
ments that are needed to support the overall programme. Detailed
technical content exists at the lower levels of the roadmap, which
cannot be seen in static and printed version in Fig. 14.
5.5. Technology Roadmapping as an ongoing process
Naturally, a multi-faceted R&D programme is dynamic, and there
will be developments in both the in-house activities and relevant ex-
ternal fields that will influence the details of the programme. In order to
retain value as a functional tool, roadmaps must be updated periodi-
cally to capture developments and to reflect progress in the develop-
ment lines, or to account for strategic changes. All accompanying tools
– linkage grids, TRL assessments, and TGI analyses – must be frequently
updated. The timescale for updating will depend on the specific de-
velopment activity. As a guiding principle, the most effective mode is to
update the roadmap to match agile build-measure-learn hardware de-
velopment cycles. Such updates could be done for the roadmap as a
whole, or for individual TGIs that may advance in parallel but at dif-
ferent rates. As shown in Fig. 10, it is anticipated that workshops will be
used for this function. For the Tokamak Energy programme, this is
expected to be approximately every six months.
6. Outcomes and uses of Technology Roadmapping
As mentioned in Section 5, there are multiple outcomes and uses of
Technology Roadmapping. At Tokamak Energy, the process and the
developed roadmap impacted planning activities, which supported the
management of the innovation process and facilitated communication.
Figure 14. Features and content based on the Technology Roadmap as developed for Tokamak Energy. Precise details are not shown respecting Tokamak Energy
confidentiality requirements.
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6.1. Roadmapping to support planning and guide innovation
The roadmap aids management in making effective high-level de-
cisions. The colours and shapes on the roadmap, as shown in Fig. 14,
supports the identification of methods of resolution for specific tech-
nology challenges akin to a “make or buy” decision (see (Albright and
Kappel, 2003)). In addition, for Tokamak Energy, this facilitates the
identification of potential IP opportunities – and the timescale upon
which such opportunities should be exploited – by determining which
technology should be developed in-house and which should be devel-
oped through collaboration or outsourcing. Similarly, linkage grids
allow the construction of coherent plans that align the functions of the
company to ensure that all drivers, both technical and commercial, are
considered in plotting the future pathway(s).
More generally, however, the layered and time-based structure of
the roadmap provides a means to map the innovation system for
Tokamak Energy. Many agile management techniques depend on visual
methods. The developed roadmap is aligned with the phases of the S-T-
A-M model with specific MVDs and an MVP outlined for Tokamak
Energy, which means the innovation stages and the trajectory for
commercialisation can be plotted and continuously reviewed. Viewing
the innovation system in the format of a roadmap allows for potential
challenges and opportunities to be plotted in line with the relevant part
of the system that they might impact. The separation of the elements of
the system in the roadmap also facilitates the agile and lean innovation
approach todevelop technologies in parallel.
Experts and managers within Tokamak Energy have specialist
knowledge, which, together with TGI analysis, facilitates the identifi-
cation of the required technology development steps and the develop-
ment of strategies to address or resolve the TGIs. Such indiviudals were
identified and allocated as “TGI owners” to manage and develop in-
formation and strategies for specific TGIs. TGI owners are afforded the
autonomy to decide how to solve the problem – perhaps with further
input from other team members or expert consultants, via focus
workshops (see 5.2.4). At a higher level, the roadmap, along with-
corresponding linkage grids, facilitates understanding of how TGIs
impact one another and allows the team to understand the importance
of their development area on the overall Tokamak Energy programme.
This provides two key benefits. Firstly, TGI owners can provide ideas on
the way forward for specific TGIs, which can then be used to inform the
development of a strategy for the overall programme. Secondly, as each
TGI owner contributes their ideas and strategies, the roadmap provides
a tool to guide the development of more detailed project plans, parti-
cularly where the integration of separate technology development
streams is necessary.
For Tokamak Energy, the roadmap thus acts as a tool to guide
technology planning while not disrupting current experiments or
technology development activities, making it a useful agile manage-
ment tool. Going forward, if the process and the roadmap are con-
tinually updated to be aligned with build-test-learn cycles, it will form a
useful metric to measure agile innovation as a step-wise process. In
effect, it can be used to capture and manage any changes in company
strategy, as well as results or breakthroughs from technology develop-
ment and experiments in the last cycle, informing planning for the next
development cycle.
6.2. Additional uses of the Technology Roadmap
In addition to its primary role as a management tool to support
programme development and facilitate agile innovation, roadmaps can
have other useful functions. For example, they can be used in the
management of uncertainty and risk (see (Ilevbare et al., 2014)) and in
the communication of the planned development programme to different
audiences (see (Kerr and Phaal, 2015)). Both such applications were
considered for the Tokamak Energy roadmap.
6.2.1. Managing uncertainty and risk: Scenario Planning
Uncertainty and risk are unavoidable in cutting-edge, high-tech-
nology, development programmes (Phaal et al., 2010, Ilevbare et al.,
2014). For fusion start-ups, uncertainties arise in several areas: for ex-
ample, plasma behaviour as higher performance operating regimes are
achieved, uncertainty in materials properties as materials are operated
in new environmental regions, and supply and performance of key
materials required for device construction such as HTS magnet tape.
Other uncertainties and constraints, for example, the available work-
force (including recruitment) and securing investment are also im-
portant aspects. Roadmapping allows preparation for times of pre-
dictable change and affords insights on how to react during times of
unpredictable change. A roadmap can also be used as a tool to support
scenario planning to help to manage these uncertainties and support
strategic decision-making. In scenario planning, candidate future paths
are developed to assess the level of risk in different elements of the
programme. A forward path can then be chosen based on acceptable
risk. Acceptable risk is not necessarily the level of risk with which one is
satisfied. Instead, it is an understanding that while risk is unavoidable,
when multiple paths exist and one path must be taken, the risks of
pursuing that path are understood and accepted versus the alternatives
(Derby and Keeney, 1981).
To illustrate the process, we consider a fusion start-up with two
possible paths forward to the intended goal: the demonstration of a
fusion device producing net energy gain, illustrated in Fig. 15. On one
path; path “A”, an intermediate device is built and technologies tested,
and uncertainties de-risked through this device, while the second path;
Figure 15. Comparison of two possible forward paths: path A and path B, in the
development of a fusion device capable of net energy gain, produced using
information from the technical roadmap. The key technical uncertainties, an
assessment of the cost and time of the pathways can be compared relative to
one another. Path A, where TGIs are de-risked to a higher level before making
the next step, takes longer and has a higher total cost primarily because of the
longer time to the FOAK device. Path B is likely to be cheaper and faster but
carries greater risk and requires more resource in the near-term. Note: resources
scale is arbitrary and for illustration only.
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path B, goes directly from current devices but has additional R&D on
key components in which the results of the R&D are integrated later.
Path “A” enables the testing of key components and materials in a re-
levant environment. It thus builds experience and knowledge, but in-
evitably takes longer, thereby potentially resulting in the integrated
cost and time to the realisation of the goal to be higher. Path “B” could
be faster and lower cost but, in comparison, carries higher technological
risk. Such a process was used at Tokamak Energy. The information from
the roadmap was transposed into a graphic showing device progression,
dates of demonstrations, technologies to be developed (TGIs), and a
plot estimating key resource requirements (workforce and cost). A
traffic light system, using green, amber and red, was used to provide a
simplified version of TRLs as a metric to show TGI progression, and thus
the de-risking of technology over time. The path forward was chosen
based on an assessment of the risks and uncertainties associated with
each which allowed the company to move forward with plans based on
accepted risks.
6.2.2. Supporting public communication
Roadmaps with the level of depth and type of details, as shown in
Fig. 14, are useful for staff within a company or organisation for the
optimisation and management of the path forward. The roadmap at
Tokamak Energy was used as a visual platform for communication both
in workshops and for general dialogue between staff within the com-
pany. However, other audiences are also interested in the intended path
forward to, for example, potential investors, scientific journalists and
researchers in related fields. Different views of the roadmap can be
created for these audiences.
At Tokamak Energy, a roadmap for public communication has been
created, which is shown in Fig. 16. The public communications
roadmap shows the requirements of future devices and the intended
dates for operation. The development phases for ST-4014, ST-F1, and
ST-E1 are aligned with the phases of innovation shown in the S-T-A-M
model in Fig. 3, where “pre-cursor”, “embryonic” and “nurture” were
here defined for Tokamak Energy's mission as being; “research and
development”, “engineering demonstration” and “commercial roll-out”
respectively. There is an explicit reference to the HTS magnet devel-
opment programme as a critical enabling technology, as well as to TGI
progression, and the intention for collaboration in the development
programme. The overall appearance took inspiration from a range of
previous roadmaps designed for communication, principally those by
NASA but also from others referenced in (Phaal et al., 2010, Kerr and
Phaal, 2015). “Spin-in” technologies, such as 3D printing, were in-
cluded to signify Tokamak Energy's approach to capture external
technology developments. Similarly, "spin-off” streams for technologies
being developed in-house highlight other potential commercial oppor-
tunities, including HTS magnet development which has the potential to
be a significant spin-off success. Together, these contribute to the
overall aesthetic of the convergent-divergent structure, which was in-
spired by Chesbrough's open innovation funnel (Chesbrough, 2003).
Here, all activities converge on ST-F1 as a focal point before diverging
representing the numerous prospective commercial routes that have
been identified outside of the primary goal of electricity generation.
This representation of the roadmap allows interested parties to
quickly grasp the company's mission and thus assists inquiry into spe-
cific topics of interest, providing a bridge for discussions regarding all
aspects of the programme. Alternative views of the roadmap could also
be developed for instance to show the cost of individual TGI streams, to
highlight IP opportunities that have been identified across TGI streams,
or show the resources required to deliver specific programme elements.
7. Future roadmap development: introduction of a commercial
market layer
Through the roadmapping process, commercial considerations have
been incorporated into the roadmap developed for Tokamak Energy,
but further consideration and integration of commercial drivers is
possible. Methods and tools exist to support analysis of the commercial
or “market” aspects, and these are commonly applied to support stra-
tegic management and for roadmapping. Three such methods are
Figure 16. Structure and features of Tokamak Energy's “Roadmap for Faster Fusion”, developed to support public communication. For a view of the current plan and
timescales, see (Tokamak Energy Tokamak Energy Ltd Website).
14 ST-40X is the extended operation of ST-40, which is a key test machine on
the path to ST-F1.
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PESTLE, SWOT and the innovation matrix.
PESTLE analysis assists the identification and understanding of the
political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental
(hence “PESTLE”) factors external to an organisation that may impact
internal development (Newton and Bristoll, 2013). It has been used
previously as a functional tool to support roadmapping in high tech-
nological ventures (see (Brenden et al., 2009)), and several elements of
the method have already been incorporated in the roadmap developed
for Tokamak Energy. To carry out the analysis, the possible influence of
external factors on each element of the development programme (ma-
chines, projects, TGIs etc.) are identified and considered and, if ap-
propriate, the development path adjusted to avoid potential problems
or conflicts. For example, materials planned for the resolution of
technical gap issues would be reviewed for their environmental ac-
ceptability and, if potential problems identified, alternatives would be
sought. Similarly, the international transfer of specialist and potentially
restricted use materials, such as tritium, requires compliance with
specific legal and regulatory considerations (Pearson et al., 2018), and
it would be beneficial to identify the requirement and take appropriate
measures early. Of course, effective project management includes such
preparations, but the PESTLE analysis formalises the process and brings
the results and needed activities into the roadmap.
A method similar to PESTLE is SWOT, whereby strengths, weak-
nesses, opportunities and threats (hence “SWOT”) in both the internal
and external environment are explored and characterised (Pickton and
Wright, 1998). SWOT analysis would likely be used at a system level
rather than for specific technical gap issues. It is particularly useful for
assessing markets and for evaluating competition. For example, it could
be used to compare opportunities and challenges associated with de-
veloping an electricity-generating fusion power plant versus developing
a fusion reactor for desalination; both of which have been identified as
potential future applications for fusion technology (see Pearson, 2020).
Both applications will serve a different market, both will involve dif-
ferent competitors, and both will likely involve different specifications
for the technology to be developed. All of these factors may play to the
strengths or weaknesses of the company's current technology capability.
SWOT analysis could be used to characterise these, and to adjust the
development plan towards desired applications.
Through the use of PESTLE and SWOT methods, content for an
additional “market” or a “commercial” layer of the roadmap would be
developed. Developing such a layer would require the involvement of
management as well as advisors specialising in specific areas such as
law and economics. An additional linkage grid would be added to
characterise the links between the new layer and the existing layers of
the roadmap. A tool specifically for this purpose is the innovation
matrix, which is a strategic tool that was developed to identify and
understand the links between technology uncertainty and the need for
that technology, that is whether a technology will be “ready” to meet a
required application (Groenveld, 1997, Matthews, 1991). In many
ways, the innovation matrix is similar to a linkage grid, but the in-
novation matrix is deployed to identify innovation opportunities spe-
cifically. As such, it could be used to connect a “market” layer to the
other layers of the roadmap. Once completed, the results of both ana-
lyses would be integrated into the roadmap.
8. Generalisability of the developed framework for other potential
applications
All roadmapping processes are adapted to the needs of the organi-
sation to which they are being applied. Despite efforts to create an
objectively useful roadmapping framework by extracting the steps and
lessons learned from the application to Tokamak Energy as a fusion
start-up case study, the process was inherently tuned towards the
company's needs and was guided by the company's management.
Additional applications of the process would allow an assessment of its
generalisability and would facilitate further development. Preferably
those applications would be to other fusion start-ups. However, the
process could also be usefully applied as a tool to support other mis-
sions from outside of the fusion sector that require similarly significant
cost or time, and which involve the development of novel and complex
hardware. In particular, the framework presented could be applied to
missions that can be broadly categorised as problems that provide
substantial societal benefit and that are world-changing. Such missions
have a clear vision but typically work against substantial time pressure
which requires ambitious but realistic cross-disciplinary R&D and in-
novation (Mazzucato, 2018). The framework presented can be used to
guide innovation in such missions. Possible applications could be to
support innovation and technology planning for “Generation IV” nu-
clear fission start-ups, or for missions to develop advanced low-carbon
aircraft or biotechnology. Such missions all have high costs; similarly
lengthy timescales from R&D to commercialisation; and multiple
technical hurdles to overcome which presents substantial risk (see
(Bowen, 2019, Singer and Bonvillian, 2017)). It may also be able to
support X Prize Foundation missions, which are focused on enabling the
realisation of disruptive technology to help deliver a better, safer and
more sustainable world (see (Hossain and Kauranen, 2014)). An ex-
ample of an existing X Prize mission is a call for the development of a
technology to convert carbon emissions into useful products (see
Carbon X Prize (Carbon X Prize Foundation Website: carbon.xprize.org
2019)). The roadmapping framework, as well as the characterised in-
novation approach, could be used to inform or guide sectors or even
governments, as well as start-ups, for missions focused on agile hard-
ware development.
9. Summary
The research presented in this paper comprehensively characterises
the fusion start-up innovation system. Current programmes to develop
fusion energy have been assessed in the context of innovation. The
characteristics of the model of innovation – agile innovation – being
pursued by recently emerging fusion start-ups, which are seeking a
faster route to fusion, have been identified. Fusion start-ups are com-
pared with government-funded fusion programmes which have, thus
far, dominated fusion development. Public fusion programmes mostly
follow a linear model of innovation, in which commercial aspects are
not considered until later in development. We show that fusion start-
ups are pursuing a fundamentally different route to the realisation of
fusion energy in which longer-term commercial aspects influence the
near and mid-term development programme. It is known from other
technology fields that Technology Roadmapping is a useful tool to aid
innovation. A method to develop a technology roadmap as a tool to
support innovation in fusion start-ups has been developed. It has been
applied to the development programme being pursued by Tokamak
Energy Ltd, a privately funded company that is pursuing rapid devel-
opment of commercial fusion via the spherical tokamak and high-
temperature superconducting magnets. Our method has two key steps.
First, it identifies the critical technical challenges that have to be
overcome to achieve commercial fusion energy; it orders, characterises
and prioritises the challenges; identifies and characterises links between
them, and then identifies and develops potential methods of resolution.
An initial roadmap is then drawn up and linked to the strategic goals of
the company as well as the planned build-up of resources, such as
workforce and facilities. In the second step, subject matter experts and
appropriate company staff are involved, via dedicated review work-
shops and supported by focus workshops, in developing content which
adds depth to the existing roadmap. A metric – technology readiness
levels – can be used for judging progress on the technical elements
towards commercialisation. The developed roadmap is then most ap-
propriately updated at intervals aligned with agile build-measure-learn
cycles and the development in relevant external factors.
At Tokamak Energy, in addition to its primary role assisting in the
management and development of the technical programme, the
R.J. Pearson, et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 158 (2020) 120064
20
roadmap has been used to manage uncertainty and risk through in-
vestigation of alternative candidate scenarios and thereby assisted in
the selection of the most favoured path. It has also been used to com-
municate company plans to different audiences – potential investors,
scientific journalists, researchers in related fields – by developing dif-
ferent representations of the roadmap. Further development and uses of
the roadmap are possible through the application of tools, such as
PESTLE and SWOT analyses. Potentially the developed roadmapping
process could be applied to development programmes in similar fields;
particularly for endeavours that involve technical uncertainty, sig-
nificant cost or time, and require the development and integration of
novel and complex technologies. Such applications have been briefly
mentioned.
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